Who Owns the Seed?
From Patent Rights to Market Power: An Investigation into the Future of Farmers’ Choice
By Mehdi A. Mohagheghi | Iran
Investigative Feature | Agriculture, Economics and Intellectual Property
A seed is the starting point of the food chain. In modern agriculture, however, a seed is not merely a natural input. Behind many commercially sold seeds lies a network of intellectual-property rights, technology licences, sales contracts, research investments and corporate decisions that shape how seeds are developed, marketed and used. This system can help finance new varieties and improve agricultural productivity. It can also raise difficult questions about prices, competition and farmers’ freedom to choose.
This report does not begin with the assumption that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are either inherently beneficial or inherently harmful. Its central question is narrower and more practical: when a relatively small number of companies own key seed technologies or control access to them, what consequences does that have for production costs, market competition and farmers’ choices?
To examine the question, this report draws on research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), data from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), official competition-enforcement documents, court records and published interviews with farmers who have had different experiences with genetically engineered seeds and the rules governing their use.
The evidence comes largely from the United States and from international market research. It therefore cannot, by itself, describe every national seed market. Laws, crop systems, export requirements and the structure of agricultural businesses vary substantially from country to country. The cases are used here to illuminate mechanisms and questions, not to claim that the same outcomes occur everywhere.
1. A Market Defined by More Than the Seed Packet
To understand the seed industry, counting the brands on shop shelves is not enough. A commercial seed may combine a plant variety, one or more patented genetic traits, a licence to use a technology and a distribution agreement. The company selling the seed to a farmer may not own every technology incorporated into it; it may have obtained permission from another company to use some of those technologies.
This distinction is particularly important in crops with genetically engineered traits. A trait that allows a plant to tolerate a specific herbicide, for example, may be protected by intellectual-property rights and made available through commercial licences. In such a market, competition is not determined solely by whether another company can produce a similar seed. Access to technology, genetic material, distribution networks and legal permissions can also determine which businesses are able to compete.
The OECD’s 2018 report, Concentration in Seed Markets, found that concentration varies by crop and country. Some markets—notably certain markets for maize, sunflower and canola—are highly concentrated in particular countries. Other crops, including wheat and barley, may have different market structures. The report also observed that concentration in markets for genetically engineered traits can be greater than concentration in the market for the finished seed itself.
That distinction matters. Several brands may be visible to farmers, yet some of those brands may depend on licences from a limited number of owners of key technologies. The number of brands, therefore, does not necessarily reveal how many independent sources of technology exist.
At the same time, concentration is not proof of misconduct. A market with a small number of suppliers does not automatically demonstrate that prices are unfair, innovation has declined or farmers have been harmed. Research and development can be expensive, and a successful new variety or trait may require years of investment and testing. Larger firms may be able to finance that work at a scale smaller competitors cannot match. The policy question is whether the benefits of scale and innovation coexist with meaningful competition and practical alternatives for buyers.
The OECD did not find clear evidence that increasing concentration, on its own, had caused seed prices to rise or innovation to fall. It pointed instead to a complex relationship involving market structure, regulation, research, licensing and the characteristics of individual crops. That caution is essential: the evidence supports scrutiny of concentration, not a presumption that every large company or every patented seed has produced a harmful outcome.
Source: OECD, Concentration in Seed Markets: Potential Effects and Policy Responses (2018).
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/concentration-in-seed-markets_9789264308367-en.html
2. What the Numbers Show: Market Shares and the Cost of Seed
Data from the United States Department of Agriculture provide a more specific view of one of the world’s largest agricultural markets. A USDA Economic Research Service analysis published in 2023 reported that, between 2018 and 2020, Bayer and Corteva together supplied seed used on 72 per cent of US maize acreage and 66 per cent of US soybean acreage.
These figures refer to acreage planted in two crops in the United States during a defined period. They should not be described as the companies’ share of the entire global seed market, or even as their share of every seed category within the United States. They nevertheless indicate that decisions made by a small number of suppliers can affect a substantial proportion of commercial production in some important crop markets.
The same USDA analysis reported that, from 1990 to 2020, the average price index paid by US farmers for crop seeds increased by 270 per cent. Over the same period, the index of prices received for agricultural commodities rose by 56 per cent. For seeds of crops predominantly grown with genetically engineered traits—including maize, soybeans and cotton—the average increase in seed prices was reported at 463 per cent.
The figures raise an economic concern: over this period, seed prices increased much faster than the prices farmers received for agricultural commodities. But a comparison of price indexes does not, by itself, establish why that happened. It cannot prove that genetic engineering or market concentration alone caused the increase. New traits, changes in the mix of seed varieties, research costs, inflation, changes in seed performance and market power may all contribute. The indexes also do not tell us, by themselves, whether a farmer’s total cost of production increased by the same proportion.
A more complete assessment would compare the cost of seed with the economic value of the crop produced, while accounting for other inputs and risks. A more expensive seed may, in some circumstances, deliver higher yields, reduce losses from certain pests or simplify weed management. In other circumstances, its additional cost may outweigh those benefits. Results depend on the crop, local conditions, pest pressure, farm management, the price of the harvested crop and the availability of alternatives.
The relevant question is therefore not simply whether seed has become more expensive. It is whether farmers receive sufficient and reliable value in return, whether they can assess that value using accessible information, and whether they have realistic options if a particular product no longer meets their needs.
This distinction also matters when comparing farmers. A large commercial farm may be able to spread costs across thousands of acres, negotiate supply arrangements or access specialist advice. A smaller operation may have less bargaining power and fewer ways to absorb a price increase. National averages can conceal those differences. More detailed research would need to examine farm size, crop type, region, seed traits, licence conditions and the costs of switching suppliers.
The available data establish a trend that merits investigation. They do not justify a simple causal claim that one technology, one company or one legal rule explains every price increase.
Source: USDA Economic Research Service, “Expanded Intellectual Property Protections for Crop Seeds Increase Innovation and Market Power for Companies,” 28 August 2023.
3. Intellectual Property: An Incentive to Innovate, or a Limit on Choice?
Legal protection for plant varieties and biotechnology is one way companies seek to recover their investments in research and development. Developing a new variety or commercial genetic trait can require years of research, field testing, regulatory assessment and investment. If competitors could immediately reproduce every successful innovation without restriction, private firms might have less incentive to fund some costly projects.
Yet the same legal protections can limit how other people use a technology. Depending on the jurisdiction, the type of intellectual-property right and the terms of a licence, farmers may not be permitted to save and replant harvested seed containing a patented trait without permission. These rules differ across countries and types of seed. There is no single worldwide rule that applies identically to every crop, variety or farmer.
The case of Indiana farmer Vernon Hugh Bowman became a prominent example of the tension. Bowman grew soybeans and bought Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seeds for part of his planting. For a later planting, he sought a less expensive source of seed by purchasing soybeans from a grain elevator. He knew that the grain could include seeds carrying the herbicide-tolerance trait. He planted the soybeans, applied the relevant herbicide and saved seed from the resulting crop for further planting.
Monsanto sued, arguing that this process infringed its patents. The dispute reached the US Supreme Court. In 2013, the Court ruled in Monsanto’s favour, holding that the patent-exhaustion principle did not give Bowman a general right to reproduce patented seeds by planting and harvesting them. The ruling was specific to US patent law and the facts before the Court; it should not be treated as a universal rule for all seeds in every country.
In a report published on 18 February 2013, NPR journalist Dan Charles described the dispute and the practical role that herbicide-tolerant seeds played in Bowman’s farming. The case illustrates the central trade-off. A technology may provide a farmer with a useful option, while the legal rights attached to that technology restrict how the farmer can reproduce it.
The legal question is not identical to the broader policy question. A patent ruling determines the rights and obligations recognised by law. It does not, on its own, establish whether the price of the seed was fair, whether a particular licensing system is good agricultural policy or whether farmers have enough competing options. Those questions require additional evidence about costs, market access and the availability of substitutes.
The Bowman case nonetheless shows that seed ownership is not an abstract debate. It affects the practical boundary between buying a product and reproducing it. In many areas of agriculture, farmers have historically saved and replanted seed, although practices differ by crop and commercial system. When a seed includes a protected trait, the legal and contractual conditions attached to that trait can change the choices available to the farmer.
A balanced assessment must recognise both sides of the issue. Intellectual-property protection can reward the development of useful innovations. But when rights cover technologies that become difficult to avoid, the terms of access can affect not only farmers but also independent breeders and seed companies seeking to compete.
Source: Dan Charles, NPR, “Farmer’s Fight With Monsanto Reaches the Supreme Court,” 18 February 2013.
https://www.kunc.org/npr-news/2013-02-18/farmers-fight-with-monsanto-reaches-the-supreme-court
4. When the Destination Market Changes the Seed Decision
The experience of Joseph Peila, a farmer in Washington State, shows how the consequences of a seed-related issue can extend beyond the field and into the market for the harvested crop.
In a report published on 9 October 2013, Associated Press journalist Nicholas K. Geranios described how part of Peila’s alfalfa crop was rejected for export after testing detected a low level of a genetically engineered trait known as Roundup Ready. The trait allows a plant to tolerate a particular herbicide.
Peila told the Associated Press that he did not know how the trait had entered his crop. State testing confirmed the low-level presence of the trait, but the report did not establish its origin. It therefore cannot be used as proof that a particular company was responsible for the trait’s presence, or that a specific act of wrongdoing had occurred.
According to the report, an export broker rejected alfalfa grown on 70 acres because of the test result, although the hay could potentially be sold domestically. Peila produced much of his alfalfa for export, and the report conveyed his concern that producing export-quality hay was central to his livelihood.
The episode illustrates a point that can be missed in discussions focused only on yields or farm-level performance: a seed is not suitable merely because it grows well. The regulations of a destination country, buyer requirements, contract terms and the ability to keep different crops separate can affect the commercial value of the harvest.
The case must also be kept distinct from the issue of patent ownership. The Associated Press report did not demonstrate that intellectual-property rights caused the incident. Nor did it identify the route by which the trait entered the crop. Its relevance lies in showing that a crop’s genetic characteristics may affect access to a particular market, while the farmer may not have a clear answer about how the characteristic came to be present.
For farmers selling into export markets, the commercial question can be especially demanding. A crop may be legally grown in one place but fail to meet a buyer’s requirements elsewhere. That can make traceability, testing, seed sourcing and communication between growers and buyers economically important. The cost of a rejected shipment can fall on the farmer even when the source of the problem has not been established.
This does not mean that genetically engineered crops inevitably create export problems. The risk depends on the trait, the destination market, the applicable rules, the buyer’s requirements and the controls used during production and handling. It does mean that seed decisions should be evaluated in the context of the entire supply chain rather than the field alone.
Source: Nicholas K. Geranios, Associated Press, “Wash. Farmer Wants to Protect Growers From GMO Seeds,” 9 October 2013.
5. A Different Experience: Why Some Farmers Defend the Technology
The market cannot be understood fully without listening to farmers who choose genetically engineered seeds and consider them useful.
On 18 June 2019, Laura Barrera published an interview for the International Food Information Council (IFIC) with Katie Pratt, a farmer in Illinois. Pratt and her family farmed 7,500 acres of corn, soybeans and seed corn. In the interview, she said that all the commercial corn and soybeans grown on their farm were genetically engineered, while the family also produced seed corn that was not genetically engineered.
Pratt described her own experience as including fewer pesticide applications in some of their genetically engineered crops. She also said that insect-resistant traits had helped reduce the need to apply insecticides against certain pests.
These are statements about one farmer’s experience, not findings that can automatically be applied to every farm. Outcomes depend on the crop, the trait, the pest, the herbicide or insecticide involved, local conditions and farm-management practices. The interview also appeared in a publication by an organisation whose coverage presents a generally favourable view of food biotechnology. It is therefore useful as a record of a farmer’s perspective, but it is not a substitute for an independent, systematic comparison of costs and results.
Even with that limitation, Pratt’s account highlights a crucial part of the debate. Some farmers choose genetically engineered seeds because they expect practical benefits, such as easier weed control, fewer operations in the field or improved control of certain insect pests. For those farmers, abandoning the technology may also carry costs and risks. The availability of a non-engineered seed does not necessarily mean that it will perform equally well under the farm’s particular conditions.
A policy discussion that focuses only on restricting one technology, without measuring the consequences for production and farm management, could overlook these experiences. But the opposite mistake would be to use a single farmer’s account as proof that the technology is always beneficial. Neither approach can replace evidence collected across different crops, regions and farming systems.
The comparison between Pratt’s experience and Peila’s illustrates why context matters. Pratt described the practical value she associated with traits used on her farm. Peila’s experience involved the rejection of part of a crop from an export channel after a test detected a trait whose origin was not established. These are not contradictory findings: they concern different crops, commercial settings and questions. Together, they show why farmers’ choices depend on both agronomic performance and the requirements of the markets in which they sell.
Source: Laura Barrera, International Food Information Council, “GMOs: Q&A With Farmer Katie Pratt,” 18 June 2019.
https://ific.org/insights/gmos-qa-with-farmer-katie-pratt/
6. Competition Happens Beyond the Brand on the Seed Packet
Competition in the seed industry takes place at several levels. Companies compete to sell finished seed to farmers. They may also compete to obtain licences for genetic traits, acquire access to breeding material, develop new varieties or offer better prices and services. The terms under which one company licences a technology to another can shape the range of products available to farmers.
As a result, a market can contain several seed brands while still presenting barriers to independent businesses. The relevant questions include whether smaller seed companies can obtain access to important technologies on workable terms, whether licensing arrangements allow them to compete effectively, and whether farmers can switch to alternatives without facing prohibitive costs or contractual restrictions.
These questions have appeared in US competition-enforcement activity. On 20 May 2026, the US Department of Justice announced that Bayer CropScience had changed certain terms in its commercial loyalty and discount programmes following an investigation into possible restrictions on competition in seed markets.
According to the department’s announcement, the programmes had linked eligibility for certain discounts to sales targets across both corn and soybean businesses. The department raised concerns that such arrangements could limit competition. Bayer committed not to restore the challenged links and certain related incentives for seven years.
The announcement is significant because it directs attention beyond the price paid by a farmer for a bag of seed. The terms governing relationships between technology owners and independent seed companies can also affect which businesses are able to offer products and compete for customers.
However, a regulatory concern and a final judicial finding are not the same thing. The department’s announcement of changed programme terms and a commitment does not mean that every possible allegation against Bayer was proved in court. A careful account should state what the agency announced without turning it into a broader finding that the evidence does not support.
A week later, on 27 May 2026, Reuters reported that independent seed company Latham Quality had sued Bayer, alleging anticompetitive conduct in the US market for genetically engineered corn seed. The allegations included concerns about independent companies’ access to alternatives involving a herbicide-tolerance trait. Bayer denied the allegations, describing them as baseless and maintaining that agricultural markets were competitive and lawful.
At the time of the Reuters report, the claims were allegations in a lawsuit, not a final determination of liability. Their relevance to this investigation lies in the importance of technology access and licensing terms to competition. The eventual legal outcome should not be assumed in advance.
Together, the two developments illustrate why seed-market analysis must examine more than the number of companies selling products. A seed company may need access to particular traits to offer a competitive product. If access depends on licensing terms, commercial incentives or bundled arrangements, those terms may influence the range of products available downstream. Whether a particular arrangement violates competition law depends on the facts and the applicable legal standard, but the underlying issue is important enough to warrant scrutiny.
Sources:
– US Department of Justice, announcement of Bayer commitments concerning seed discount and loyalty programmes, 20 May 2026.
– Reuters, report on Latham Quality’s lawsuit against Bayer, 27 May 2026.
7. Who Bears the Cost and the Risk?
Intellectual-property protection can support investment in research and development. The policy challenge is to preserve that incentive without unnecessarily restricting access to technology or weakening competition.
If farmers face higher costs for seed, complementary technologies and associated inputs, they need a way to assess the benefits they receive. If an independent seed company cannot access a necessary technology on workable terms, the range of products it can offer may narrow. If breeders and researchers cannot access genetic material or obtain essential licences, developing new varieties may become more difficult.
On the other hand, eliminating or weakening intellectual-property protection without considering its effects could make it harder for researchers and firms to recover the costs of developing new products. That could reduce the incentive to undertake some forms of costly research. The choice between unrestricted corporate control and the absence of any legal protection is therefore a misleading one. The challenge is to design rules that reward innovation while maintaining competition, allowing new businesses to enter and preserving meaningful choice for farmers.
The OECD’s analysis points to several possible policy directions, including reducing unnecessary barriers to entry, facilitating access to genetic resources and intellectual-property licences, and supporting both public and private research. Such measures can complement competition-law enforcement and help create a market that is both innovative and contestable.
Transparency is also important. Farmers need accessible information about seed prices, performance claims, contractual restrictions and the practical conditions attached to a technology. Independent seed companies need to understand the terms on which they can obtain licences. Regulators need enough information to distinguish legitimate rewards for innovation from commercial arrangements that unnecessarily foreclose competition.
The distribution of risk deserves closer attention as well. A company may earn revenue from a patented trait across a large market, while an individual farmer bears the immediate consequences of crop failure, a rejected shipment or a sudden change in input prices. That does not establish that the company caused the loss, but it raises a question about how risks are allocated along the supply chain and whether contracts and market institutions provide reasonable protection to those who bear them.
Any proposed policy should be assessed against evidence about actual outcomes. Does it improve access to technology? Does it encourage new products? Does it allow independent suppliers to compete? Does it help farmers compare the total costs and benefits of alternative seeds? Does it preserve incentives for long-term research? A policy that advances one goal while undermining the others may simply move the problem from one part of the market to another.
These questions also need to be asked crop by crop and country by country. A system suitable for large-scale commercial corn production in the United States may not suit wheat, smallholder farming or a country whose agricultural sector relies heavily on public breeding programmes. The structure of the market and the needs of farmers should shape the response.
8. Questions That Remain Unanswered
The available evidence establishes important facts, but it does not provide a complete picture of the effects of seed ownership. Several questions require more detailed investigation.
What is the actual market share in each crop and country? Aggregate figures can conceal differences between seed varieties, genetic traits, regions and distribution channels. A rigorous analysis should separate the market for finished seed from the market for key technologies and examine how much choice farmers have in practice.
How much of the price increase is attributable to new traits, research costs, changes in input costs or market power? Price indexes establish trends, but identifying causes requires more detailed data. Researchers would need to compare seed prices, crop performance, production costs and available alternatives over time, while controlling for changes in the products being sold.
Do licensing contracts enable independent companies to compete? The existence of a licence does not, on its own, establish that access is fair or unfair. Relevant evidence would include licence terms, fees, restrictions, exclusivity provisions, discount arrangements and the ability of independent businesses to develop products that compete effectively.
What alternatives do farmers actually have? A product may be listed as an alternative but may not be agronomically suitable, available in sufficient quantities or commercially viable in a particular region. Research should examine the cost of switching suppliers, the performance of alternatives and the practical constraints faced by different farm sizes.
Who receives the economic gains? If a technology improves yield or reduces some costs, the benefits may be shared among farmers, seed companies, technology owners, processors and consumers. Measuring those gains requires more than comparing seed prices. It requires accounting for production costs, crop prices, risk and changes in the value of the harvest.
How do export rules affect seed decisions? Where crops are sold into markets with specific requirements, farmers may need clear information about seed sourcing, testing, segregation and traceability. Researchers should examine how those systems work in practice and how costs are allocated when a shipment fails to meet a buyer’s requirements.
Answering these questions requires disaggregated market data, access to relevant contracts and records, interviews with farmers and independent seed companies, and comparisons of costs and performance under similar conditions. Without that evidence, attributing every price increase or every competition problem to a single technology or company would go beyond what the available sources establish.
This report is based on published research, official documents and interviews conducted by other journalists. Those sources provide a foundation for identifying the central issues, but they do not replace original fieldwork. Further reporting would benefit from interviews with farmers of different sizes, independent breeders, seed distributors, agricultural economists, competition specialists and the companies named in relevant disputes. It would also require giving subjects a fair opportunity to respond to specific findings and checking documentary evidence against their accounts.
Conclusion: Farmers’ Choice as a Test of the Seed Market
The story of seed ownership is not a simple conflict between science and nature, or between modern technology and traditional farming. It is a story about the relationship between innovation, property rights, economic competition and farmers’ ability to make decisions.
Bowman’s case demonstrates that intellectual-property rights can impose specific limits on reproducing patented seed. Peila’s experience shows that a seed-related issue may affect access to a particular market, although the source of the trait detected in his crop was not established. Pratt’s account, in contrast, records why some farmers choose genetically engineered technologies for the practical benefits they believe those technologies provide.
At the market level, US data show substantial concentration in some seed categories and significant long-term increases in seed-price indexes. Those figures do not, on their own, establish a causal relationship between concentration, technology and price. Meanwhile, competition-enforcement activity demonstrates that the terms governing relationships between technology owners and independent seed businesses are an important part of the debate.
The central question—who owns the seed?—is therefore not simply a question about the company named on a package. It is a question about who can access the technology, who sets the conditions for its use, who bears the costs and risks, and how much real decision-making power remains with the farmer.
A seed market can be innovative and competitive when protection for research and intellectual property is accompanied by workable access to technology, fair opportunities for competitors and meaningful choices for farmers. The appropriate test is not whether a technology should be judged good or bad in advance. It is whether evidence shows that the market delivers benefits, distributes costs and risks transparently, supports innovation and preserves the ability of farmers to choose products suited to their circumstances.
The evidence reviewed here does not justify a universal verdict on genetically engineered seeds or on every large seed company. It does justify asking more precise questions about market power, licensing, prices and the practical options available to farmers. Those questions should be answered with transparent data, independent research and reporting that includes both the companies that develop technologies and the people who use them.
Ultimately, ownership matters because it shapes access. And access matters because the choices made at the beginning of the food chain influence not only what farmers plant, but also what they pay, which markets they can serve and how much control they retain over their own production.
Primary Sources and Documents
1. OECD. Concentration in Seed Markets: Potential Effects and Policy Responses (2018). https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/concentration-in-seed-markets_9789264308367-en.html
2. USDA Economic Research Service. “Expanded Intellectual Property Protections for Crop Seeds Increase Innovation and Market Power for Companies” (28 August 2023).
3. Nicholas K. Geranios, Associated Press. “Wash. Farmer Wants to Protect Growers From GMO Seeds” (9 October 2013).
4. Dan Charles, NPR. “Farmer’s Fight With Monsanto Reaches the Supreme Court” (18 February 2013).
https://www.kunc.org/npr-news/2013-02-18/farmers-fight-with-monsanto-reaches-the-supreme-court
5. Laura Barrera, International Food Information Council. “GMOs: Q&A With Farmer Katie Pratt” (18 June 2019).
https://ific.org/insights/gmos-qa-with-farmer-katie-pratt/
6. US Department of Justice. Announcement of Bayer commitments concerning seed discount and loyalty programmes (20 May 2026). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/antitrust-division-secures-seed-tying-and-loyalty-program-commitments-bayer
7. Reuters. Report on Latham Quality’s lawsuit against Bayer (27 May 2026). https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/bayer-sued-allegedly-monopolizing-us-market-gmo-corn-seeds-2026-05-27/
